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Abstract — The 2012 UK Government’s Alcohol Strategy for England and Wales has been welcomed broadly and resulted only in
muted criticism within the UK public health community. This is despite strong continuities with previous alcohol industry construc-
tions of the nature of the problem and preferred policy responses. This is probably because the strategy shows progress on the public
health lobby’s key issue of pricing of alcohol beverages. There are, however, many problems with the wider content of the strategy,
showing little interest in much needed industry regulation other than on price, and an absence of commitment to investment in
research. Some dilemmas posed for the research community are discussed.
The UK Government Alcohol Strategy for England and Wales
(Secretary of State for the Home Department, 2012) has broadly
been welcomed as a step in the right direction that needs to go
further. The Lancet (2012) suggested that the ‘government
should be commended for taking strong, effective steps to
reduce alcohol consumption that will save lives’. Alcohol
Research U.K. (2012) ‘broadly supports the approach adopted’.
Witnesses giving evidence to the first session of the parliamen-
tary health select committee in April gave similar praise (BMJ,
2012a). Ian Gilmore, Chair of the Alcohol Health Alliance and
former President of the Royal College of Physicians, saw this as
an important milestone in the first acceptance of evidence that
price, availability and marketing cause alcohol problems, albeit
with weaker responses in the latter areas than called for
(U.K. Parliament Health Select Committee Inquiry into the
Government’s Alcohol Strategy, 2012a).
The commitment to introduce minimum unit pricing
(MUP) of alcohol had been particularly championed by
public health advocates as very likely to help reduce the
current UK population levels of alcohol problems. The prin-
ciple of MUP has been conceded, with the exact price per
unit to be consulted upon. While the Scottish Government
have decided upon a 50 pence per unit rate, the UK Prime
Minister offers the example of 40 pence in his foreword,
though it is important to note that low price is defined there
as ‘the root cause of this problem’. The definition of the
problem therein is particularly interesting. It begins:
‘Binge drinking isn’t some fringe issue, it accounts for
half of all alcohol consumed in this country. The crime and
violence it causes drains resources in our hospitals, generates
mayhem on our streets and spreads fear in our communities.
My message is simple. We can’t go on like this. We have to
tackle the scourge of violence caused by binge drinking.’
(Secretary of State for the Home Department, 2012, P. 2).
This framing of the problem relegates the importance of
mortality and morbidity due to long-term heavy drinking,
and invites a multi-sectoral approach led by criminal justice
rather than health agencies. The strategy document empha-
sizes the construct of ‘irresponsible’ drinking. This belongs
to a wider industry narrative that locates the problems caused
by alcohol in the behaviour of their customers rather than in
the nature of the drug or in the industry’s corporate practices
(see for example, SAB Miller, 2012). Throughout the
strategy document this rather nebulous construction of
‘responsibility/irresponsibility’ is applied both to the behav-
iour of individuals and to that of businesses. What it actually
means is, of course, open to interpretation. The industry is
happy to accept injunctions on responsibility, with the
Portman Group having already previously rebranded itself as
‘the responsibility body for alcoholic drinks producers in the
U.K.’ (Portman Group, 2011).
After short chapters having been devoted to statements of
the problem and price and advertising, the remaining chap-
ters are concerned with local community actions, supporting
individuals to change and ‘shared responsibility with indus-
try’. The content of this latter chapter eschews any enhanced
regulatory stance; concrete recommendations are absent.
Lauding the progress of the Responsibility Deal (Bonner and
Gilmore, 2012) forms the substance of this material,
wrapped up in corporate friendly content on the importance
of alcohol to the economy, and the need to cut red tape, i.e.
deregulation. Encouragement of further industry involvement
in education, messaging in advertising, prevention and other
interventions is to be facilitated by the expansion of
Drinkaware, originally established by the Portman Group
and hitherto entirely industry funded.
The new announcement choreographed on the same day as
the publication of the strategy but strangely not contained
within it, was the Responsibility Deal pledge to reduce the
alcohol content of drinks in response to market research indi-
cating consumer demand (BMJ, 2012b). This could yield
public health benefits if it does successfully reverse increases
in the potency of standard beers and wines over the last 10–20
years available in the UK, and the growth of superlagers, high
strength ciders and similar products particularly likely to be
affected by an MUP for alcohol. We do not, and cannot, know
whether this would have happened anyway without the
Responsibility Deal. It could be taken, however, as achieve-
ment of the tough-sounding action to ‘Challenge the industry
to meet a new set of commitments to drive down alcohol
misuse’, a call that lacked any more specific content. The
Strategy seems to ignore the fact that the approach to public
health through the Responsibility Deal was widely criticized
by bodies such as the British Medical Association, the Royal
College of Physicians and Alcohol Concern and lacked much
support beyond government and industry (BMJ, 2011).
The role of the current Health Secretary and indeed the
Department of Health in the production of the Strategy is
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unclear. It is not surprising therefore that the terms of refer-
ence of the UK Parliamentary Health Select Committee
Inquiry into the Alcohol Strategy are prominently concerned
with establishing who is responsible within Government for
alcohol policy and the role of the industry (U.K. Parliament
Health Select Committee Inquiry into the Government’s
Alcohol Strategy, 2012b). The Committee is also considering
the evidence; and Alcohol Research UK for one has voiced
some disappointment that the Strategy lacks ‘explicit refer-
ence to the need for high quality research to evaluate these
measures’ (Alcohol Research U.K., 2012).
Across the Irish sea, there is a strong commitment to
evidence-based policy involving research as one of the five
main pillars of the emerging national substance misuse strat-
egy (along with supply, prevention, treatment and rehabilita-
tion; Department of Health, 2012). This points policies in a
very different direction, following a period of industry self-
regulation and partnership work that failed. For example, in
relation to advertising and sponsorship sweeping mandatory
changes are now in the process of being introduced which
will prohibit all outdoor advertising of alcohol; employ a
9.00 p.m. watershed for alcohol advertising on television and
radio; subject advertising in the print media to stringent
codes, enshrined in legislation and independently monitored;
and end industry sponsorship of sport and other large public
events in Ireland by 2016 (Department of Health, 2012).
In France, a blanket ban on advertising prevents alcohol
manufacturers from associating themselves with sporting
events such as the Olympic Games. These restrictions on
alcohol advertising have been tested at the EU level
(European Court of Justice, 2004). In the UK, however, the
lack of similar controls has allowed Heineken UK to be one
of the principal sponsors of the London 2012 Olympics. The
new strategy simply makes non-specific proposals lacking
clear targets or concrete actions, beyond working with the
Portman Group and other bodies, as has been done previous-
ly (Secretary of State for the Home Department, 2012).
Public health activists in England and Wales will be partici-
pating in the consultation to achieve as high a MUP as pos-
sible, commensurate with the anticipated benefits,
notwithstanding uncertainties about the precise magnitude of
effects (McCambridge and Kypri, 2009). Making plain the
Strategy’s limitations with respect to advertising and availabil-
ity should help develop the case for a more genuinely strategic
and evidence-based response. There are also less obvious and
more difficult questions to consider, such as concerning the re-
lationship of the research community to bodies such as
Drinkaware that are funded by the industry, and participation
in governmental initiatives heavily influenced by industry
(Adams et al., 2010). Some activities may be well considered
realpolitik and others misguided follies, and both may perpetu-
ate fundamental problems associated with industry involve-
ment in alcohol policy making (Babor, 2000, 2009; Jernigan,
2012). Such problems certainly do not only afflict the current
UK Government (Room, 2004; Anderson, 2007).
We should not be reticent about making the case for greater
public funding of UK alcohol research. While the UK Medical
Research Council (2010) has recognized the need for capacity
building, its own Addiction Research Strategy devoted only
small sums to this aim and failed to gain more than paltry
sums from the Economic and Social Research Council and
other important funders. In contrast, the multi-national alcohol
beverage manufacturer SAB-Miller, to take one example, has
separate departments devoted to Alcohol Policy, UK
Government Relations and Reputation and Corporate
Communications all engaged with policy makers in the UK.
Better understanding of the alcohol policy environment itself
(Hawkins et al., 2012) and what social scientists describe as its
corporate capture (Miller and Harkins, 2010) is surely a neces-
sary precursor to enhancing capacity for the design of effective
policies that really will reduce alcohol harms. Now that would
be a truly responsible approach to take.
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